The IEA’s 2026 outlook reports that, excluding rare earths, the average share of the leading refining country reached 72% in 2025, versus 70% in 2023. It also says the number of mineral tariff codes covered by Chinese export controls has tripled since 2023. These are report-period observations, not a fresh October shipment count.
Opinion: abundance is answering the wrong question
A global surplus answers whether there is enough material in aggregate. Our security test asks whether a particular customer can obtain a usable product through a supply chain that survives a disruption.
Those can be different questions. In our analysis, a second deposit is of limited strategic use if its output must pass through the same constrained refinery. A second refinery is of limited use if it lacks reliable feedstock, acceptable recoveries or customers willing to qualify its product.
That is why we would resist treating the announcement of a mine as the completion of an industrial strategy. A ribbon-cutting ceremony is a very economical substitute for a flowsheet, until someone asks for delivery.
A better scorecard for public money
Our proposed scorecard would track four things: dependable feedstock, demonstrated processing, customer acceptance, and a viable financing plan. Each should have dates and milestones. Announced capacity should remain separate from commissioned capacity and sustained production.
We would also ask where the chain can fail. Does a new plant still depend on one overseas reagent supplier? Does its financing rely on a subsidy that has only been proposed? Does its customer agreement require qualification that has not occurred? A national flag on the building cannot answer these questions.
For policymakers, our opinion is that support should purchase measurable resilience. Payments linked to independently checked operating milestones would be easier to defend than a cheque justified by an impressive resource number alone.
The honest objection: diversification can be expensive
Our framework accepts that a diversified route may cost more than buying from an established producer. It may also duplicate capacity that would otherwise be unnecessary. The security argument must state what disruption it insures against and why the additional cost is justified.
If customers will not pay a premium, policymakers should be explicit about who pays it and for how long. Otherwise, in our assessment, an industrial-policy debate can disguise an unresolved commercial problem. Strategic importance does not create a customer’s budget.
There is also a risk of overbuilding the wrong stage. We would rather see a smaller functioning chain with proven customers than a larger collection of disconnected announcements. That is an editorial preference, not a forecast that any named project will fail.
What would change our view?
We would become less concerned if alternative routes demonstrated sustained deliveries and commercially durable demand. We would become more concerned if project announcements multiplied while the actual points of dependence stayed the same.
The Take: measure the doors a buyer can use, not just the tonnes the world possesses. The strategic asset is the functioning chain.
Opinion and analysis, as of 9 October 2026. Do your own research: read the linked documents and current filings before making financial decisions.